Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) program : external evaluation report by D3 Consultants: Excellence in the Practice of Dialogue, Deliberation & decision-making & Thomas, P.
 
D3 Consultants 
Excellence in the practice of Dialogue, Deliberation & Decision-making 





Peace & Conflict Impact  
Assessment (PCIA) Program 



















Commissioned by IDRC  
 Peacebuilding and Reconstruction 
Project number: 100226 
External Evaluation of PCIA Project  Page 2 of 37 
Contents 
 
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 3 
Background and Context of the Evaluation ..................................................................... 6 
Purpose of Evaluation and Intended Users ..................................................................... 7 
Methodology.................................................................................................................... 7 
Evaluation Findings ......................................................................................................... 9 
Project design and implementation: Some important challenges .............................. 11 
The Consortium Approach & Institutional Challenges ............................................ 11 
Conceptual / Methodological Challenges ............................................................... 12 
Operational Challenges.......................................................................................... 13 
Project Outputs.......................................................................................................... 14 
Resource Pack....................................................................................................... 14 
Summary of Initial reactions from stakeholders and potential users................... 14 
Examples of Uptake ........................................................................................... 15 
Dissemination ..................................................................................................... 17 
Translation.......................................................................................................... 17 
National Applications.............................................................................................. 17 
Lessons learned reports......................................................................................... 20 
Awareness-raising & Training ................................................................................ 21 
Awareness-raising .............................................................................................. 21 
Training .............................................................................................................. 22 
Role of the Steering Committee ............................................................................. 23 
Other considerations.................................................................................................. 24 
Gender ................................................................................................................... 24 
North / South Research.......................................................................................... 24 
IDRC’s involvement along the way......................................................................... 25 
On Mainstreaming.................................................................................................. 25 
Conclusions................................................................................................................... 27 
Annex 1 List of documents reviewed............................................................................. 29 
Annex 2 List of Individuals interviewed.......................................................................... 30 
Annex 3 Questions posed by IDRC for the Evaluation.................................................. 31 
Annex 4 Dissemination Plan ......................................................................................... 32 
Annex 5 Institutional Learning for IDRC ........................................................................ 34 
External Evaluation of PCIA Project  Page 3 of 37 
Executive Summary 
In August, 2004 IDRC commissioned the following external evaluation of the Peace and 
Conflict Impact Assessment project.   The purpose of the evaluation was to measure 
initial impacts that the PCIA project and its outputs are having with intended users and 
to gather the information necessary to render an account for this project and its results 
to CIDA.  A secondary and lesser objective was to facilitate institutional learning through 
reflection on IDRC’s role and involvement in this project. 
The methodology of this study consisted of a review of background documents including 
the project proposal, project activity and progress reports, internal IDRC documents 
including assessments, handover notes, email correspondence and the major research 
output of this project, The Resource Pack.   Web searches were made using “conflict 
sensitivity” and “peace and conflict impact assessment” as a way of tracking references 
to this project that might suggest some level of influence or uptake in the fields of 
humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding targeted by this project.   A 
total of 39 interviews were conducted with key interlocutors of the project including the 
project partners, donors, NGOs, and potential users of the Resource Pack.    This study 
is limited by the fact that significant data was gathered in only one of the three Southern 
contexts where the project was implemented.   A field officer of IDRC was able to travel 
to Sri Lanka to conduct interviews with a number of stakeholders involved in the local 
implementation of the project.   No such field officer was in place in Uganda or Kenya to 
conduct on-the-ground interviews.    Efforts to gather data via email correspondence 
and phone interviews were not effective. 
There were four primary objectives of this project: 1) Develop practical resources and 
approaches to PCIA and conflict-sensitive development; 2) Enhance awareness and 
use of conflict-sensitive approaches to development among practitioners, governments, 
donors and non-governmental organizations; 3) Collate lesson learned from the 
operational application of resources and approaches; and 4) Facilitate dialogue 
between southern NGOs and communities, their governments and donors through 
consultations, thus promoting the representation of civil society perspectives in 
development assistance programs and projects. 
The project was implemented with a consortium approach involving three UK-based 
organizations and three Southern-based partners.   One of the successes of the project 
was the way in which the Consortium partners were able to manage the inherent 
complexity of needing to coordinate work across so many organizations spanning from 
North to South.   The complexity of this project was exacerbated by the fact that this 
project was conceived and designed by individuals at one level, managed at another 
level and implemented by partners in the South.    
Other challenges encountered during the implementation of this project include: 1) a 
conceptual shift from “PCIA” to “CSA” representing a broadening of perspective; 2) staff 
turnover rate of nearly 100 percent in the Consortium partners as well as IDRC and 
CIDA staff involved in this project; 3) the decision to produce the entire Resource Pack 
rather than just the first three modules which constituted an operational shift influencing 
other important components of the project such as training, national applications and 
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lessons learned reports; and 4) FEWER’s financial difficulties and resulting bankruptcy 
that brought the project to a premature end. 
Satisfying the different interests and expectations of multiple donors, the six consortium 
partners as well as beneficiaries of the project involving stakeholders from humanitarian 
assistance, development and peacebuilding organizations posed a significant dilemma 
of how general or specific the Resource Pack should be in terms of the following issues:  
1) target audience (international organizations, governments, donors, NGOs, CBOs, or 
all the above); 2) context (local, national, regional); 3) focus (sector-specific or more 
generic); and 4) method (prescriptive or descriptive).  Regardless of how these 
questions were answered, tradeoffs were required in terms of outcomes.    
Within the context and conditions of this project, there was no “right” way to respond to 
these questions without some tradeoffs.   It was decided that the Resource Pack would 
target all stakeholders and present an array of tools and approaches rather than 
prescribe a selected set.   Though a chapter is given to sectoral work, the focus would 
remain general and generic in order to serve the broader public across contexts and 
sectors.    
One of the significant contributions of this project is the way in which the decision to 
privilege breadth and generality over depth and specificity allowed for the cross-
fertilization of ideas and practices by gathering, analyzing and making public the 
experiences and knowledge related to conflict sensitive practices accumulated within 
the private domain of many different organizations 
The design of the project and consortium approach resulted in a rich and dynamic 
process that successfully engaged an extensive array of stakeholders on both global 
and local levels in conversations about conflict sensitivity.   The strategy used locally in 
the three Southern contexts of bringing stakeholders together from government, donors 
and NGOs created not only the possibility of increased awareness of conflict sensitivity 
in their own work, but also the possibility of developing a common language and vision 
extending across these different stakeholder groups as they work collectively at conflict-
sensitive development in their regions.   Awareness raised at the global level throughout 
this project has contributed to that fact that conflict sensitivity has now become part of 
the lexicon of many development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations. 
The Resource Pack produced under this project has made an important contribution to 
the global literature on peace and conflict impact assessment methodologies and 
conflict sensitivity particularly in light of the fact that it is the only compendium which 
documents and analyses from a critical perspective, the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of PCIA tools, guidelines and practices currently in use amongst bilateral, 
multilateral and international NGOs.     
While initial indications of impact suggest the project has had greater influence in 
Northern-based donor and international NGOs, impact in Southern-based organizations 
working at the local level has been more limited.   The prospects for sustainability and 
increased impact will depend upon the extent in which partners in the South continue to 
move forward with the trainings and national applications processes that have only 
recently begun.  Contextualizing the Resource Pack, framing its contents in a more 
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appropriate language and level of abstraction will be a vital step towards making it more 
immediately relevant for local practitioners.    
Another important contribution of this project was the systematic way in which conflict 
sensitive approaches were linked to the entire programming cycle.   Issues and 
suggestions about how conflict sensitivity can inform each step in the programming 
cycle are effectively addressed in the Resource Pack.    However, it stops short of 
providing comprehensive case studies drawn from experience illustrating the application 
of conflict sensitivity throughout the entire cycle.   An important next step would be 
further research to observe, document and produce case studies involving the 
application of CSA throughout an entire programming cycle.   This could involve more 
traditional case-study research on existing experiences or the design of a participatory 
action research project in a Southern context.   The development of local as well as 
sector-wide case studies to accompany the Resource Pack would greatly enhance its 
relevance and utility for practitioners at all levels 
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Background and Context of the Evaluation 
IDRC’s involvement with the concept of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment reaches 
back to 1997, when the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program (PBR) 
commissioned a working paper on the topic.  Between 1998 and 2001, PBR nurtured 
this line of work through a variety of actions including, the hiring of consultants to field 
test PCIA as a methodology and the development of a three year multi-stakeholder 
PCIA project. This “flagship project” was managed first through a PCIA Unit which was 
set up in PBR.  This period witnessed an increased interest amongst bilateral and 
multilateral organisations - and to a lesser extent amongst international NGOs - to 
develop PCIA tools in order to mainstream conflict analysis into their programs and 
projects. 
In mid-2001, IDRC decided that PCIA should be rolled out to the field - particularly to 
southern partners. PBR formed a partnership with the Peace and Security Unit at the 
Canadian International Development Agency - CIDA (formerly the Peacebuilding Unit) 
in order to co-fund a CAD $696,000 program implemented by the UK-based Forum on 
Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) in collaboration with its member 
organisations International Alert and Saferworld, and three Southern-based 
organizations, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) in Uganda, African Peace 
Forum (APFO) in Kenya, and Consortium for Humanitarian Assistance1 (CHA) in Sri 
Lanka.   Together, they have endeavoured to promote mainstreaming of conflict 
sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance and 
to enhance the capacity of practitioners to apply conflict sensitivity in their work. 
On September 29, 2003, PBR supplemented and extended this project, and extended 
FEWER’s grant to March 31, 2004.  This was done in order to allow the project partners 
additional time to complete and disseminate the resource pack, conduct an awareness 
raising seminar in Ottawa, undertake translations of the pack into French and Spanish, 
further develop the web platform for the resource pack, and conduct an evaluation.   
Though no further funds were requested of them, CIDA had already agreed to a project 
extension, giving IDRC until June 30, 2004 to oversee completion of the work of the 
recipients as well as to prepare the final technical and financial reports. 
With the resource pack completed and 2,500 copies disseminated, IDRC and CIDA 
jointly hosted an awareness-raising seminar in Ottawa in February of 2004, inviting 
representatives from NGOs in Canada working in the conflict and peacebuilding fields, 
as well as experts and representatives from CIDA, IDRC and Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade - DFAIT.   The project consortium (FEWER, International 
Alert, Saferworld), including the regional partners, led this exercise and launched the 
resource pack for the first time.  Immediately following the seminar, PBR and CIDA met 
with the members of the consortium project team to discuss remaining work left to be 
done on the project.  This included the translations, web site development and launch, a 
report on lessons-learned in the field and a final evaluation.   The research team 
indicated it would likely need more time beyond March to complete the work, but funds 
remaining would not cover all costs expected.  It was agreed that the team would submit 
                                                 
1 CHA joined the project after the project’s inception and once the project secured additional funding (Dutch).   
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to IDRC a proposal of what could reasonably be achieved to complete the project in the 
time remaining prior to the finalization of the project at the end of June 2004. 
Regrettably, IDRC was informally warned by International Alert on April 14, 2004, that 
FEWER was experiencing major financial difficulties but that they and the other project 
partners remained committed to the project and its completion.  FEWER’s financial 
instability was confirmed by its director, Marcel Smits and by Fisher Partners (a private 
firm that deals with insolvency) who, on April 20, 2004, formally notified IDRC that 
FEWER had declared bankruptcy and was being liquidated.  An examination of 
FEWER’s books is currently underway by the insolvency practitioners.  In this regard, 
IDRC’s General Counsel Office engaged a lawyer in the UK to assist with the 
representation of IDRC as a creditor concerning the outstanding commitments to this 
project.  PBR has also fully notified CIDA of the situation and other internal IDRC units 
were also informed.  An internal IDRC meeting was held on May 21st to discuss next 
steps for this project and the best ways to ensure that as many of the maximum number 
of the desired outputs and commitments of the project could be achieved.  CIDA, 
through its Peace and Security Unit, was kept abreast of these developments by PBR. 
IDRC expects to receive an updated financial report for this project from the liquidators 
as soon as the process of reviewing FEWER’s books is completed.  In the meantime, 
PBR has received approval from CIDA via email to extend its agreement with them until 
December 31, 2004 to allow for additional time for the financial reports to be received 
and an initial assessment to be made of the impact this situation has had on project 
commitments. 
 
Purpose of Evaluation and Intended Users 
The primary purpose of this external evaluation is to measure initial impacts that the 
PCIA project and its outputs are having with intended users and to gather the 
information necessary to render an account for this project and its results to CIDA.    
A secondary purpose is to facilitate institutional learning by reflecting on IDRC’s own 
role and involvement in this project (included in separate annex).    
The readers of this evaluation will be CIDA and IDRC.  Comments on institutional 




The scope and methodology of this evaluation were conditioned by the following 
considerations related to the timing and context in which it took place:   
1) With questions still outstanding concerning the financial issues related to 
FEWER’s bankruptcy and the liquidation process, funding for the evaluation 
needed to be kept to a minimum.   This meant relying on IDRC field staff for on-
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the-ground interviews in the countries of the Southern project partners rather 
than having the evaluator travel to these locations. 
2) Still unclear about the full impact of FEWER’s bankruptcy on the project partners, 
IDRC recognized and wanted to be sensitive to fact that the partners’ time and 
availability to participate in an evaluation at this time might be very limited.    
3) Because of an unexpected turnover in staff, IDRC did not have a field officer in 
place in Africa that could interview partners and organizations related with the 
project in Uganda and Kenya. 
4) Due to significant changes in the project itself as it unfolded (to be discussed 
later) along with its unexpected interruption and termination because of 
FEWER’s bankruptcy, IDRC recognized that a more thorough evaluation of 
project results and impact at this time was, to a large extent, premature.   The 
two years of implementation were mostly consumed in research, consultation 
and drafting the Resource Pack.  With the Resource Pack completed, 
awareness-raising, training and the national application processes mentioned in 
the project proposal were only recently beginning to unfold. 
In a meeting with the consultant contracted to conduct this external evaluation, IDRC 
discussed these conditions and together the following decisions were made concerning 
the scope and design of the evaluation process: 
1) Methods of data gathering would include: 
a. Desk-top reading of background documents relating to the project 
including the project proposal, project activity and progress reports, 
internal IDRC documents including assessments, hand-over notes, email 
correspondence, etc., and the major research output of the project (the 
Resource Pack).    A list of documents reviewed for this study appears in 
annex 1. 
b. Web searches on “conflict sensitivity” and “peace and conflict impact 
assessment (PCIA)” to discover references tracing back to this project that 
might suggest some level of influence in the fields of humanitarian 
assistance, development and peacebuilding targeted by this project.  
c. Interviews (face-to-face, telephone) and exchange of written information 
(emails) with key interlocutors of the project including the project partners, 
donors, NGOs, government officials and potential users of the resource 
pack.   Annex 2 contains a list of individuals interviewed. 
2) The number of interviews would be primarily limited to those persons and 
organizations directly involved in the implementation of the project, i.e., CIDA, 
IDRC and the six consortium members.   While a more thorough evaluation 
would require more extensive interviewing of direct and indirect beneficiaries as 
well as other important actors in the field of implementation, especially in the 
southern contexts where this project was carried out, the aforementioned 
conditions forced a more limited scope.   
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3) In Kenya and Uganda, interviews would be conducted by the evaluator via 
telephone and email correspondence.  Given the awkwardness of this medium of 
communication, interviews would be limited to the project partners directly 
responsible for the implementation of this project in these two southern contexts.  
4) In case of Sri Lanka, an IDRC field officer would travel to the region and conduct 
face-to-face interviews on the ground and report back the findings to the external 
evaluator.  
All interviews were based on a loosely structured protocol of open-ended questions that 
sought to elicit stories, anecdotes and other information that responded to the set of 
specific questions identified by IDRC in consultation with CIDA and listed in annex 3 of 
this document.    In general, the interviews revolved around the following questions:  
success stories with regard to application of PCIA (CSA) within target organizations; key 
challenges faced during the process; experience of partnership between UK-based 
partners and the Southern-based partners; learnings concerning North/South 
partnerships in joint research and knowledge creation; the uptake of the Resource 
Pack; initial signs of impact and how project or program initiatives have been informed 
by it; its significance to the local context; how PCIA (CSA) has been received by local, 
national, regional and international organizations; the role and functioning of the 
Advisory Committee. 
A total of 39 individuals were interviewed.  Each interview lasted on average 75 
minutes.   Unfortunately, the degree to which the findings in this report can adequately 
reflect the project’s experience in the South is severely limited due to a number of 
unsuccessful attempts to gather data from two of those contexts.   Input directly from 
the African partners in Kenya and Uganda was limited to a very brief phone 
conversation, complicated by a poor connection, and an equally brief response from 
one of the partners to a questionnaire sent via email.    Fortunately, it was possible to 
reach an expanded array of stakeholder organizations in Sri Lanka and gather important 
data concerning some Southern perspectives on this project. 
 
Evaluation Findings 
The PCIA project was designed with two aims in mind: 1) To mainstream peace- and 
conflict-sensitive development practice into the planning, design, monitoring and 
evaluation of development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding work; and 2) 
Enhance the capacity of development, humanitarian and peace-building practitioners, 
as well as local governments and civil society organizations to contribute more 
effectively to conflict prevention.2
The objectives of the program were to: 
1. Develop practical resources and approaches to PCIA and conflict-sensitive 
development practice that are built on local experience and capacity;  
                                                 
2 Taken from Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: A CPRN Programme  November 2001. 
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2. Collate lessons learned from the operational application of resources and 
approaches;  
3. Enhance awareness and use of conflict-sensitive approaches to development 
among practitioners, governments, donors and non-governmental organizations, 
through the widespread use of the resources and approaches developed in these 
applications;  
4. Facilitate dialogue between southern NGOs and communities, their governments 
and donors through consultations, thus promoting the representation of civil 
society perspectives in development assistance programs.  
Expected results in terms of outputs include3: 
• A resource pack to serve as a tool for humanitarian and development 
practitioners, providing methods and mechanisms for conflict-sensitive 
approaches to development assistance;  
• Increased awareness among practitioners of conflict-sensitive approaches to 
development through dissemination of the resource pack, lessons learned 
newsletters, and web site updates, as well as expert meetings, awareness 
raising seminars and training workshops;  
• A training module prepared and development practitioners trained in PCIA;  
• An inclusive governance and advisory Steering Committee to ensure that the 
program is effectively implemented and benefits the peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention community. 
An evaluation of any initiative is assessed not only against its proclaimed aims and 
objectives, but also against the often dynamic context in which the process of its 
implementation unfolds.  Changes in the process or the context often result in the need 
to either modify the objectives themselves or adjust the degree to which the original 
ones can be expected to be achieved.   Understanding and valuing the process 
becomes as important as the results or outcomes produced. 
Because this is particularly true for the PCIA project given its inherent complexity, the 
discussion on findings begins by addressing some important challenges encountered as 
the process of implementation unfolded.  The following outputs identified in the project’s 
log frame will then be discussed separately: The Resource Pack; National Applications; 
Awareness-raising & training; Lessons-learned reports; and the Steering Committee.  
Ending this section will be a discussion on some more general issues related to this 
project. 
 
                                                 
3 IDRC’s webpage on project.  http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-33786-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html  
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Project design and implementation: Some important challenges  
 
The Consortium Approach & Institutional Challenges 
One of the great strengths of this project contributing to its success was the use of a 
consortium approach that brought together organizations from both the North and the 
South.   The three Northern UK-based partners brought to the table significant 
experience and expertise in research on a global level4 as well as a large global 
network (FEWER) that would be of strategic importance to the project.   The three 
Southern-based partners offered specific contexts in which local knowledge and 
practice could help shape the research and development of the concepts, tools and 
approaches ultimately intended to serve these same and similar contexts in developing 
countries.   One of the influences of the South on the project happened early on where 
feedback received from the Southern partners resulted in a change of language from 
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) to Conflict Sensitive Approaches (CSA) 
which also marked a conceptual shift away from a more mechanistic tools-centered 
approach to much broader way of seeing and approaching development work.      
One of the reasons this approach added value to the project was the way in which 
together these six organizations allowed the project to extend its reach globally through 
a number of awareness-raising opportunities mentioned below,  while at the same time 
grounding it locally within the specific contexts of the three southern partners.   This 
allowed the project to engage a broad array of stakeholders including international 
NGOs and donors as well as government and local NGO actors. 
The consortium partners cited successes and significant challenges in navigating the 
division of responsibilities between the institutional challenges and complexity inherent 
in a project requiring close coordination and collaboration from six organizations based 
in both the North and the South.    One respondent expressed a high level of 
satisfaction regarding effective inter-institutional relationships achieved in this project 
since the same has not always been possible on other projects.     
IDRC indicated that throughout the project’s lifetime, the three UK-based organizations 
endeavored to forge a common agenda and approach with partners in the South.  This 
was not always easy given the different institutional cultures and learning styles 
particularly between North and South. 
Two particular institutional challenges faced during this process are important to 
mention as a way of understanding some confusion and inconsistencies that emerged 
in the interviews around how respondents understood and explained the national 
applications and lessons learned components of this project (discussed below).  First, 
this project was conceived by one group of people, managed by another, and 
implemented by yet other partners in the South.   Adding to the complexity of this 
situation was the second challenge of high staff turnover where during the course of this 
                                                 
4 While many strong research initiatives or centers exist in the South, they tend to be local or regional in scope, with 
very few (or none) working at research on a global level. 
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project turnover of those dedicated to this project was almost 100 percent not only in the 
consortium partners, but also in IDRC and CIDA.    
One of factors that helped mitigate the impact of these two challenges was IDRC’s 
willingness to accompany the process and the Consortium partners much more closely 
than originally expected.  While these challenges were managed well during the project, 
gaps in understanding did occur that had an influence on how specific components or 
outcomes of this project were understood and explained. 
 
Conceptual / Methodological Challenges 
Satisfying different interests and expectations of donors, consortium partners and 
members of the advisory or expert committee concerning the Resource Pack 
constituted another significant challenge.   Decisions had to be made around the core 
dilemma of how general or specific to be in terms of target audience, focus and method.   
Careful consideration was given to the following questions around this dilemma, 
knowing that any decision would have both advantages and disadvantages in terms of 
usefulness of the Resource Pack: 
• Should the Resource Pack target the international community of NGOs and Donors 
in order to serve desk officers and policy analysts working on country-wide 
programmatic level; or should it target field workers in local organizations and 
institutions more closely related to local project design and implementation.  The 
interests and needs, skills and competencies ranging between these extremes differ 
greatly as does the language that is appropriate for each group.   Targeting one or 
the other group would permit the possibility of greater specificity and 
contextualization at the cost of losing relevance for other important stakeholders.   
Targeting all levels would allow the project and Resource Pack to remain more 
generally relevant to all stakeholders at the expense of being more specifically 
useful to any of them.  
• Should the Resource Pack be sector specific or more generic in focus?  Again, at 
stake is the tradeoff between greater relevance and utility for specific sectors versus 
more general relevance for a much broader range of publics and contexts. 
• The question of method was whether to develop and prescribe one or several 
specific tools and approaches in more depth that could be used across contexts; or 
avoid being more prescriptive by presenting a broad array of tools and approaches 
that exist across contexts in order to allow potential users to then pick and use what 
they consider most relevant, or develop their own tools and approaches drawing on 
the vast array presented. 
Regardless of how these questions were answered, tradeoffs were required in terms of 
outcomes.   Within the context and conditions of this project, there was no “right” way to 
respond to these questions without some tradeoffs as will be mentioned in the 
discussion on the Resource Pack.   It was decided that the Resource Pack would target 
all stakeholders and present an array of tools and approaches rather than prescribe a 
selected set.  This was in keeping with the robust pace of development of PCIA type 
External Evaluation of PCIA Project  Page 13 of 37 
tools amongst multilateral and bilateral donors and international NGOs. Though a 
chapter is given to sectoral work, the focus would remain general and generic in order 
to serve the broader public across contexts and sectors. 
Operational Challenges  
As a result of first stakeholder meetings in Kenya and Uganda and the first meeting of 
the international advisory group, the decision was made, early in the process, to 
produce the entire Resource Pack upfront rather than just the first three modules as 
outlined in the original proposal.   This created a significant operational challenge in 
terms of the implications this had for the implementation of the other components of this 
project like training, national applications and lessons learned reports.   Part of the 
confusion mentioned around these components may also be a result of failing to make 
sufficiently explicit how these would be affected by the decision to complete the entire 
Resource Pack upfront. 
Another operational challenge involved the fact that the Sri Lankan experience came 
into the process only after significant advances had already been made in the two 
African contexts with CECORE and APFO.    While the process of stakeholder 
consultations in Uganda and Kenya began with only a topical outline of the draft 
modules, by the time the process began with CHA in Sri Lankan, the draft modules 
were partially developed.   The Consortium partners managed well the difficulty related 
to juggling these different stages of the project.   The decision to involve the African 
partners in Sri Lanka and vice versa seemed to be a useful way of sharing knowledge 
and experience between the southern contexts and allowing each to learn from the 
other. 
Another operational challenge inherent in the consortium design involving North/South 
collaboration is the difficulty of coordinating tasks between cultures that often follow very 
different rhythms in their working style, based on different concepts of time.   
Challenges related to scope of the proposed project objectives: 
From the outset, a challenge was borne from what could be considered overly ambitious 
expectations of achievement given the timeframe and the financial limitations that faced 
both IDRC and CIDA as funder of this project.  Significant delays were experienced in 
securing the CIDA and IDRC agreements needed to get the project underway; as 
mentioned earlier both organizations experienced a constant turnover of staff.  These 
would have been minor nuisances, were it not for the fact that the project was 
conceived as a two year undertaking while funding was only provided for one year. It 
was also intended that the UK consortium, with the assistance of IDRC where 
appropriate, would fill out the rest of the budget by securing other significant donor 
contributions in addition to CIDA and IDRC's core funding.  As a result, the CIDA/IDRC 
contribution of CAD 696,000 to the project was meant to cover the anticipated budget 
for one year.  In reality, this amount was stretched to encompass the duration of the 
project until March 20045, with only modest additional donor contributions from GTZ and 
SIDA.  When the UK consortium secured Dutch funding, it was allocated to a Sri Lanka 
national application, rather than applied to deficits in other budget areas.   
                                                 
5 In June of 2003 IDRC put in supplementary funding of CAD $140,000. 
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This constraint, coupled with the decision to complete the resource pack in its entirety, 
may explain some confusion concerning the achievable objectives for CIDA/IDRC 
funding and some of the deficiencies in other project outputs.   Yet, the total amount 
raised for the project was not insignificant.  Efforts perhaps should have been made to 
streamline some of the activities being undertaken in the project and reduce the amount 
of institutional dependence upon the budget to maintain staffing levels and for equitable 





One of the core outputs of this project was the development and publication of “Conflict-
sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A 
Resource Pack.”   It was produced in both hardcopy as well as electronic format for 
distribution via the Web.  As mentioned earlier, any intent to measure the impact the 
Resource Pack has had would be premature at best given the fact that it has only 
recently been published and trainings in its use are only now beginning.     
Nonetheless, a summary of some of the initial reactions of stakeholders or potential 
users that were interviewed is offered below in no particular order.   Examples gathered 
to illustrate uptake of the Resource pack are then given.  
Summary of Initial reactions from stakeholders and potential users6
a) Good compendium of tools and approaches:  Many affirmed the usefulness of the 
Resource Pack as a good compendium of tools and approaches and a helpful 
bibliography to facilitate more in depth study as needed.   The method of describing 
many tools and approaches rather than prescribing specific tools was valued.    
More could have been developed in terms of a diagnostic tool to guide users in the 
process of discerning which tools would best serve a given context. 
b) Great for beginners:  For some, the Resource Pack was seen as a very useful tool 
for beginners in terms of providing basic information and helping people begin to 
think about conflict sensitivity.  However, for people with more experience in the field 
it is less useful because it lacks depth and specificity.   For instance, some of the 
tougher, more advance issues that are not addressed in depth include: analysis of 
issues of power, methods for measuring conflict, and analysis of PCIA indicators. 
c) Limited usefulness without further contextualization:  In Sri Lanka, there seemed to 
be a sharp divide between Northern and Southern responses concerning the 
usefulness of the Resource Pack.   While those from the North tended to affirm its 
usefulness and relevance for their work, the general perception of local stakeholders 
was that its usefulness and relevance was limited by its lack of contextualization.   
                                                 
6 Since no data was gathered directly from stakeholders in the African countries, this summary does not claim to 
represent the views that may be held in Kenya and Uganda  
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Usefulness at the more local level depends on the extent to which contents are 
expressed at an appropriate level of abstraction and in language and categories 
more compatible with local knowledge.   This critique reflects one of the tradeoffs in 
the decision to focus the Resource Pack more broadly.   Had it been more 
contextualized to a specific context, its relevance beyond that context would have 
diminished.    
d) Good content…but won’t be read:  Many responses, while recognizing the potential 
value of its contents, emphasized that field workers and desk officers alike who are 
already overloaded simply do not have the luxury of time necessary to sit and read 
this much information.   This content needs to be reduced to two-page executive 
summaries that can be read and digested.   This has been an important learning for 
International Alert in their work with private sector companies on conflict sensitivity 
where documents longer than a couple pages have no place.   The challenge is how 
to further abbreviate the contents while avoiding over simplification of the concept 
and approaches to conflict sensitivity.  
e) Donor driven, northern-based product:  The fact that all the tools for conflict analysis 
included in the Resource Pack came from the North and the vast majority of them 
are geared towards analysis at the country and regional levels were reasons given 
for the perception of some that this product responds to the needs and interests of 
the North rather than the South.   The question was raised concerning the extent in 
which these tools and approaches promoted bottom-up strategies that could be 
useful for enabling communities to articulate in a systematic way their own needs 
and interests in response to development actors who try to impose development on 
them.   From this perspective, the direction of CSA as presented in the Resource 
Pack is external and downward, rather than internal upward. 
f) Integration of CSA to the programming cycle:  One of the contributions valued in the 
Resource Pack is the way in which it applied and integrated the concept of conflict 
sensitivity throughout the entire programming cycle in a more systematic way.   
While the work of many organizations has reflected conflict sensitivity, these 
experiences tend to be less systematic, more ad hoc.   The Resource Pack, for 
some, is very helpful for thinking about how to mainstream conflict sensitivity through 
the entire programming cycle.     
  
Examples of Uptake 
While this list does not pretend to be exhaustive, it does provide some examples 
gathered in the interviews and web searches that suggest that the Resource Pack has 
proven to be a valuable resource…at least for northern-based donors and international 
NGOs.      
• WANEP (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding), based in Accra, Ghana used the Resource 
Pack in their program in Ghana on building civil society capacity for conflict prevention  (This was 
the only example given that came from the South). 
• The Peacebuilding Unit at Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation is directly 
incorporating the Resource Pack into its institutional conflict toolkit. 
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• Trócaire, is the official overseas development agency of the Catholic Church in Ireland,  
references the Resource Pack in some of its materials and has adopted the terminology in its  
Policy Paper on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding – see 
http://www.trocaire.org/newsandinformation/peacebuilding/peacebuildingdiscussionpaper.htm 
• A UK-based Working Group on Conflict and Peace involving NGOs from the development / 
humanitarian field along with Saferworld and International Alert has been formed and much of its 
Terms of Reference have been inspired by parts of the Resource Pack. 
• School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University is interested in including the 
Resource Pack in course materials. 
• The Director of the Conflict Transformation Program at the Life & Peace Institute in Upsala, 
Sweden has expressed interest in incorporating and applying materials from  the Resource Pack 
in work carried out under the this program. 
• The Transition, Conflict and Peace (TCP) Working Group of InterAction, the largest alliance of 
US-based international development and humanitarian NGOs was engaged in the process and 
has posted the Resource Pack on their website to help distribute it among its member 
organizations.   They are currently trying to secure USAID funding for training in ‘conflict 
sensitivity.’  See http://www.interaction.org/disaster/TCP/index.html 
• The Resource Pack is explicitly referred to as a resource to promote conflict sensitivity in the new 
comprehensive high-level Norwegian Government Policy on Peacebuilding – see “Peacebuilding 
– A Development Perspective:  Strategic Framework” at http://odin.dep.no/filarkiv/221493/peace-
engelsk.pdf - page 15. 
• The Resource Pack was also featured in a special session of a major conference on the Role of 
Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict that brought together over 200 peace and 
development practitioners and politicians at the Ministerial level--in Dublin. 
http://www.xs4all.nl/~conflic1/Dublin/conference%20report.pdf (page 38) takes a while to 
download.  
• The UNDP has also used whole sections of the Resource Pack in its guidance notes on conflict 
prevention see: http://hdr.undp.org/docs/nhdr/thematic_reviews/Conflict_Guidance_Note.pdf 
• The Resource Pack is featured on the German Government-NGO working party on conflict and 
development as a key resource http://www.frient.de/links/links.html 
• GTZ has also referred to the Resource Pack when looking at assessments in post-conflict 
settings - http://www.gtz.de/crisisprevention/download/pcna_reviewanalysis.pdf 
• The Resource Pack has been profiled in ‘state of the art’ research thinking and overviews see a 




• Drawing on the Resource Pack and in collaboration with a number of its authors and creators, the 
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is running with Saferworld a training session on THE ROAD TO 
PEACE: Conflict-Sensitive Programming in Fragile States.  This session is listed on the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices website. 
• One of the largest international networks of front-line practitioners of Conflict Transformation is 
the Action for Conflict Transformation network.  The majority of their members are nationals 
rather than internationals.  They are having a session at their annual conference on the Resource 
Pack given jointly by Saferworld and an Action Member who works for Africa Peace Forum.  
• The Resource Pack is mentioned in “Introducing the Peace and Conflict Assessment Model 
(PCA)” by Thania Paffenholz and Luc Reychler. June 2004.  See Field Diplomacy Initiative FDI 
website: http://www.fielddiplomacy.be/English/Welcome%20Frameset.htm 
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• International Alert’s publication, “Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice: The 
Case of International NGO’s” by Maria Lange, 2004 draws on and references the Resource Pack. 
Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice: The Case of International NGOs 
 
Dissemination 
In spite of the complications related to FEWER’s bankruptcy, Saferworld and 
International Alert continue to move forward with the process of dissemination, even 
though this has required use of their own core funding.   The Resource Pack is available 
in PDF format and can be downloaded from www.conflictsensitivity.org as well as from 
IDRC’s website (http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-60789-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html).  Other 
websites such as InterAction have also included a link to the conflict sensitivity website 
as a way of raising awareness and helping to distribute the electronic version.  Annex 4 
contains the plan for dissemination of the hard copies as funding becomes available.  
Translation7  
In a February, 2004 meeting with IDRC, CIDA and the Consortium partners, an 
agreement was reached that a priority would be placed on having the translation of the 
Resource Pack translated into Spanish and French.  This work was not completed due 
to the insolvency of FEWER and the interruption of the project.  
The Organization of American States has expressed strong interest in carrying out the 
translation into Spanish and using it as part of a new process to bring conflict sensitive 
approaches to Latin America.    The translation would take place through a process of 
contextualization involving a number of consultations in the region.   However, due to 
legal complications related to the liquidation of FEWER and copyright laws, the OAS 
has not been able to move forward on this.8    
With regard to the French translation, no progress has been made.  
 
National Applications 
Both in the documentation reviewed as well as in the interviews with the consortium 
partners, the concept of national applications was unclear and inconsistent.  Early in the 
process, confusion was expressed9 about whether it referred to testing the usability of 
the Resource Pack or field-testing specific tools and methodologies by applying them to 
specific projects or programs at some point in the programming cycle, or both.  This 
confusion seems to persist throughout the process.    
For example, in an email dated August 8, 2002, IDRC refers to national applications as 
working “with a core group over the course of several months to help them apply certain 
                                                 
7 Translation of the Resource Pack was not foreseen in the original project budget. French and Spanish translations 
were to be resourced through supplementary resources provided by IDRC in August of 2003. 
8 There is a meeting tentatively planned for January, 2005 in which  IA, in consultation with Saferworld will 
continue working with the OAS to move forward with the Spanish translation. 
9 See minutes of first Advisory Committee meeting in May, 2002; minutes from the stakeholder meeting in Uganda, 
August, 2002;  
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PCIA tools to their selected programs or projects, at different points in the programming 
cycle – ante, during, post” (emphasis added). 
Later, in another memo to CIDA dated December 16, 2002, IDRC seems to understand 
national applications as limited to the field-testing of the manual rather than testing tools 
with national actors.  “We have relayed your concern about their use of the terms 
“national application” and “field-testing” – which we also find confusing.  We have 
suggested that they should re-visit the use of these two concepts and consider sticking 
to the term “field-testing” as we understand that they are actually field-testing the 
manual, rather than engaging with national actors to apply PCIA tools throughout the 
programming cycle” (emphasis added).    
An informational brochure produced by the consortium partners presents the 
component of national applications as a process of testing “the applicability of selected 
tools on the ground in relation to specific projects currently being designed, 
implemented or evaluated by donors, governments and/or local and international 
NGOs.”   And yet in a slide presentation apparently given in Ottawa in October, 2003, 
consortium partners present the national application component of the project as 
“consultations on, and testing of, drafts of the resource pack.” 
One of the significant challenges this project has had to face is the tremendously high 
turnover rate in staff working with this project.   In both CIDA and IDRC staff turnover 
was 100 percent and among the three UK-based partners, turnover was nearly the 
same, with only one person, Paul Eavis, that has remained with the project since the 
beginning.   So the confusion and apparent lack of conceptual clarity regarding the 
national applications component can be partly explained by this problem of turnover.  
Also, the fact that this project was conceptualized by one group of people, managed by 
another and implemented by yet another group introduces a level of complexity that 
exacerbated the problem of staff turnover throughout the process. 
Another aspect that probably contributed the this confusion was the recognition early on 
in the process of the need to produce the entire Resource Pack up front, rather than just 
the first three chapters as initially projected.  The made sense given that awareness 
raising, training and national applications with only half a product would be difficult and 
ineffective.   This meant that the national applications component as originally 
conceived would have to be deferred until the Resource Pack was completed or at least 
sufficiently advanced in order to have tools and methodologies available, offer training 
and then test and apply them.   I could find no documentation where this last point was 
recognized explicitly.    
Rather than recognizing the premature timing of the national applications component as 
it was originally conceived, confusion entered and for some, it was reduced to the 
consultation process for testing the usability of the Resource Pack.  For others, it 
referred to the entire package of activities carried out in the partner countries beginning 
with the research, mapping and data gathering for the draft modules. 
In the initial project proposal10, the first 6 months were to be spent doing desk research 
to gather and collate the tools and methodologies that would make up the first three 
                                                 
10 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: A CPRN Programme.   Nov. 2001 
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chapters of the Resource Pack.   With this draft of the first three chapters ready, the 
process of national application would begin with the purpose of both testing the draft 
modules and beginning the field testing of specific tools and methodologies with specific 
projects being implemented by several (“up to three”) selected organizations.  The 
process outlined for the national applications involved11: 
1) A two-day seminar involving a broad group of ONGs, community groups, 
governments from the region, and representatives from the donor community.  
The purpose of this seminar is to review the content of the modules and test their 
applicability. 
2) Immediately following the seminar, a five-day training workshop would be held 
involving a smaller number of practitioners from the region with the purpose of 
working through each of the modules in more detail and unpacking some of the 
tools and methodologies presented. 
3) Upon completion of the seminar and training workshop, field-testing would begin 
with the purpose of applying, testing and refining some of the tools and 
methodologies in several projects being implemented on the ground. 
The national application process was not implemented as specifically outline above.   
Stakeholder consultation seminars for the purpose of reviewing the draft modules did 
take place in Uganda, Kenya and Sri Lanka.    In each of these consultations, the 
project was successful in getting a broad representation of stakeholders from 
government, NGOs and the donor community as illustrated in the following table. 
  
Stakeholder Consultation Meetings 
August 26-27, 2002 Nairobi, Kenya 30 participants
12  
(approximately 50% INGOs, 25% Gov’t, 25% donors) 
August 29-30, 2002 Kampala, Uganda 26 participants  (9 donor, 4 INGOs, 8 local NGOs, 5 Gov’t) 
March 27-28, 2003 Colombo, Sri Lanka 37 participants  (7 Gov’t, 10 local NGOs, 13 INGOs, 7 donors) 
June 13-15, 2003 Negumbo, Sri Lanka 31 participants (mainly donor community) 
However, the five day training workshops that were to follow these seminars were not 
implemented.   Time did not permit simultaneous development of both the Resource 
Pack as well as the training modules necessary for these trainings.   From the data 
gathered, it seems as though the idea of accompanying several organizations over time 
in the application of several tools and methodologies in part of the programming cycle of 
a project was also not possible.   Again this is understandable given its dependency on 
the Resource Pack and developed training modules. 
Nonetheless, since the interruption of the project in April of 2004,a reduced version of 
national applications was carried out in Uganda.   Consortium partners helped facilitate 
a five-day training in Uganda with World Vision and a consortium of NGOs.  During 
these three days, the participants reviewed in more detail a number of conflict analysis 
tools and then crafted one of their own which they then used to conduct an analysis of a 
                                                 
11 Ibid p7; Minutes from Advisory Committee Meeting, May, 2002 
12 Number of participants cited does not include project staff / facilitators 
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specific region in northern Uganda.   The resulting analysis was given to some of the 
Consortium partners for review and feedback.   This is an example of effort made to 
work with local organizations in the testing of tools.   It was not clear from the data 
whether or not there was ongoing accompaniment with these organizations in terms of 
how the analysis then informed any aspect of their programming cycle.  
In Kenya, Saferworld is now involved in a process funded by the Swedish in which 85 
District Commissioners were trained in conflict sensitivity,   These District 
Commissioners then suggested to the Office of the President that all the staff in the 
District Offices also receive this training.   These trainings worked on skill-building by 
having four people from each district working together doing case analysis and 
developing action plans.    
In Sri Lanka, the national applications component consisted of forming a Core Group of 
organizations that would receive more in-depth training and then pilot some of the tools 
in their own projects or programs. Important lessons were learned throughout this 
process including the need to better tailor the training to incorporate local methods of 
learning specific to the Sri Lankan reality.  This Core Group has only recently been 
formed and so the national applications are only now getting underway. 
 
Lessons learned reports 
The original project called for two lessons learned/best practice reports to be developed 
each year to highlight insights gained from the national application and field-testing 
activities. 13   When asked about the status of these reports, there was some level of 
confusion about whether two reports were to be produced each year or one report at the 
end of the project.  Again, this confusion can be understood in light of the high turnover 
rate in staff as well as the decision to produce the entire Resource Pack up front and 
the implications this had for other component parts of the project. (See discussion 
above under national applications). 
Representatives of CIDA and IDRC met with Consortium partners in Ottawa in 
February, 2004 to discuss the status of project outputs and prioritize what needed to be 
completed in the limited time remaining.  In a memo of response dated March 5, 2004 
FEWER acknowledged the need to produce a lessons-learned report and outlines 
possible themes to be included and how this report would be produced.  However, in 
the following month IDRC was formally notified of the bankruptcy and liquidation of 
FEWER. 
Though no lessons learned reports have been produced, Saferworld and International 
Alert are currently in the process of writing an article for the Berghof series in which they 
reflect on lessons learned from this project.  A publication for the Journal of Peace and 
Development is also in production. 
                                                 
13 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment – A CPRN Programme  November 2001 and  PCIA logframe – One Year. 
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Awareness-raising & Training 
Awareness-raising 
One of the important outcomes of this project was increased awareness among 
practitioners of conflict-sensitive approaches to development.   Considering the 
significant uptake of the Resource Pack mentioned earlier in the relatively short period 
of time since its completion, it can be concluded that the project has accomplished this 
outcome with great success.   It was estimated that through the activities mentioned 
below around 600 practitioners have been in contact with the project. 
The Consortium partners worked diligently at taking advantage of many different 
contexts to promote the conflict sensitivity and raise awareness about the work being 
done in the project.   Some examples of specific conferences or meetings where they 
were able to promote the project include: 
• A workshop requested by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs on 
“Good Organizational Practice” for operational and policy desk officers dealing 
with conflict issues.  This was held in London, 2003. 
• A formal presentation in the 10th Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Network (CPRN) in Berlin – January 2003. 
• Under the umbrella of the CSA program FEWER, in conjunction with 
International Alert and Saferworld, organized a workshop on conflict analysis and 
planning methods in order to facilitate the development of country programs and 
strategies among desk officers.  This training, commissioned by the CIDA, was 
held in conjunction with the 10th CPRN. 
• Conflict Analysis for Prevention and Peace-building: Exploring the roles of NGOs 
– Washington DC March 2003.  
• Presentations made in a meeting of DANIDA and Danish humanitarian 
organizations in November, 2004 in Copenhagen. 
• At Trócaire in Ireland in June and October, 2004; In Nepal in March, 2004 in 
meeting with 35 representatives from major donors, NGOs and media (see 
cocap.org.np). 
Informally, consortium partners were present and able to promote the project in the 
following events: 
• DAC-OECD Conflict, Peace and Development Network in November 2002 
• Japan – UK seminar on Peace-building, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, & Return 
of Refugees, March 2003, University of Oxford, UK. 
One-page brochures and project summaries were designed and made available both for 
the regions where the project was being implemented as well as at global levels.   Four 
newsletters were also produced and are available electronically on the conflict 
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sensitivity website.   Also contributing to awareness-raising is the current process of 
dissemination of the Resource Pack mentioned earlier. 
While the stakeholder meetings held in the three different regions of the project were 
framed as consultations to test drafts of the Resource Pack, the awareness-raising that 
occurred through this process with the diverse range of stakeholders acting in the 
region should not be underestimated.  Similarly, the process of mapping conflict 
sensitive knowledge, tools and methodologies carried out in the regions during the 
research phase of this project also contributed to awareness-raising.  As Action 
Research recognizes, simply asking questions to gather data is an act of intervention 
that should not be underestimated. 
While the original project proposal mentions a formal awareness-raising seminar to be 
given in both Ottawa and Brussels, only one took place.  In February, 2004, a two-day 
awareness-raising seminar was held in Ottawa involving 86 individuals representing 
both the NGO and donor community.   A separate program was also offered as well to 
CIDA desk officers.   
Finally, the project was to produce an operational website and listserver as a way of 
continuing to promote awareness and provide a forum for ongoing knowledge creation 
and sharing among practitioners.    Following FEWER’s bankruptcy, International Alert 
purchased and maintains the website, www.conflictsensitivity.org where the electronic 
version of the Resource Pack is posted as well as other key documents related to the 
project.  Responsibility for the administration of a listserve by Bellanet (an IDRC 
Secretariat) was to have been by FEWER in 2003.  However, this did not happen and 
this evaluator was not able to ascertain whether a new listserve facility exists through 
either Saferworld or International Alert. 
Training 
Part of the national applications process involved a five-day training with a smaller 
group of practitioners following the stakeholder consultations in each of the southern 
regions of the project.   As explained in the discussion on national applications, it was 
not possible to offer these trainings without first completing the Resource Pack and 
without the addition of additional funds.   At the time of FEWER’s bankruptcy and the 
premature end of the project, training modules and trainings called for in the project 
proposal (other than the awareness-raising activities) had not been completed.  
Consortium partners have been involved in several different training initiatives in the 
different regions including the Ugandan experience with the World Vision lead 
consortium and the experience with the District Officers in Kenya – both mentioned 
earlier under national applications.   In Sri Lanka, International Alert has been working 
with CHA in the development of training modules14 for the Resource Pack as well as 
implementing a Training of Trainers program that began in March of 2004 with a group 
                                                 
14 IA reports that these modules are now completed.  Though no funds are available for printing, PDF versions of 
these modules designed to be consistent with the Resource Pack will be available for download from the website. 
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of 20 people representing 16-18 different organizations15.  These training modules will 
be used in the African regions as well. 
 
Role of the Steering Committee 
The project states that “an inclusive governance and advisory Steering Committee will 
be established to ensure that the programme is effectively implemented and benefits 
the broader peacebuilding community.”16   This committee was to meet for two days 
each year as well as hold quarterly teleconferences to monitor implementation and 
address issues that may have arisen.   Its membership was to include key stakeholders, 
conflict resolution specialists and representatives of partner agencies in the developing 
world.   The intent was to establish a mechanism to promote inclusivity ensuring the 
presence of different voices from all levels accompanying this process. 
On May 23-24, 2002 the Advisory Committee met for the first and only time.    Following 
this meeting it was decided that correspondence via email would replace the original 
idea of quarterly teleconferences due to the committee’s size, logistical difficulties given 
the many different time zones of the members, and the need to be more cost effective.  
Though the Consortium partners did follow through by sending periodic progress reports 
to the committee with the expectation of receiving feedback, very few responses were 
received from the committee.   Other than the initial meeting in May 2002, the intent of 
the project to create and sustain “an inclusive governance and advisory steering 
committee” was ineffective.  
The following factors may have contributed to the failure to achieve an active and 
engaged steering committee: 
• The design of the project already involved a broad number of voices when one 
considers the consortium approach involving six core implementing organizations 
from both the North and the South; five donors (IDRC, GTZ and Dutch MoFA, 
CIDA and Swedish SIDA); and beneficiaries drawn from peacebuilding, 
humanitarian and development spheres representing government, civil society, 
donors and INGOs.   The decision to include a large steering committee17 to this 
structure added a level of complexity that the project was unable to adequately 
manage. 
• Consortium partners expressed an inherent tension that existed between being 
transparent and public about the work being done and at the same time 
maintaining some proprietary control over the products.   Concern was 
expressed about how some members of the International Advisory Group used 
materials received from the project for the ends of their own work as 
professionals/academics or the work of the organizations they represented.  
Similarly, concern was expressed that some members of the committee may 
                                                 
15 IA reports that in Sri Lanka, twenty CSA workshops/trainings have been undertaken so far, with another seven 
anticipated by the end of January, 2005. 
16 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment – A CPRN Programme  November 2001 and  PCIA logframe – One Year. 
17 It should be noted that the Advisory Committee did include the partners and donors of the project. 
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have been reluctant to engage more fully with the project because of their own 
concerns regarding the use and ownership of intellectual ideas.  
• In the documents reviewed, no terms of reference or memo of understanding 
were found in which explicit expectations concerning the role and function of the 
Steering Committee or issues of intellectual property were addressed.   So it is 
unclear the extent to which the committee was set up as a formalized structure or 
was more informal in nature.    
• The size of the committee (24 people including 2 donors, 2 authors and four 
consortium members18) may have contributed to its ineffectiveness as well.   
Membership involved high profile individuals with very limited time due to their 
involvement in multiple commitments.   The possibility of disengaging or not 
responding more actively as a committee member is increased with large 
committees where each can assume other members are responding and 
providing needed feedback.  
Other considerations 
Gender   
While in several documents IDRC strongly encouraged the consortium members to 
incorporate gender analysis more explicitly (materials and bibliographic sources were 
shared with this purpose in mind), no data gathered suggested the explicit use of 
gender analysis throughout this project.   Though the assumption may exist that an 
effective conflict-sensitive approach by definition includes a gender component, this 
could have been made more explicit. 
North / South Research  
While the intent of the project was to develop resources “built on local experience and 
capacity,” the research data used for the development of the draft modules was 
primarily Northern-based data19.  Desk research involved gathering and collating 
existing tools and methodologies primarily from the North.   The mapping process 
carried out in the Southern contexts involved interviews with a number of organizations, 
many of which were Northern-based donor or international NGOs.20    
These observations are not meant to question the rigor or competence with which 
research was carried out in the project.   The intent, rather, is to recognize the fact that 
efforts to gather and systematize Southern knowledge and experience that begins with 
language, frameworks and paradigms originating in the North conditions and limits 
research findings.   Often Northern ways of knowing and talking about experience is 
quite different from Southern ways of knowing.    For instance, the number and type of 
questions (6 pages of questions) in the protocol used for field interviews reflects a 
                                                 
18 This number is taken from list of email recipients in progress reports sent.  Documentation received did not 
include an explicit list of committee membership. 
19 The inability to find southern tools should not obscure the fact that the development of thinking, material and the 
project itself was significantly informed by conflict-sensitive information and approaches harvested in the South.  It 
was suggested that the tool-biased approach taken by the North is not shared by the southern agencies. 
20 No data was gathered concerning the number or range of organizations involved in these interviews  
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Northern approach to knowledge that privileges explicit knowledge that can be gathered 
through specific direct questions.   This approach neglects other ways of knowing that 
need to be considered if local knowledge and experience is to be thoroughly explored 
and explicated.   For example, tacit knowledge might only be uncovered through story-
telling or other processes of critical reflection.   Had a research process based more on 
the principles and methods of participatory action research been used, it may have 
been possible to discover, codify, systematize and incorporate into the Resource Pack 
knowledge more reflective of Southern-based practice and experience.   This, however,  
would have required investing more time in the research process. 
 
IDRC’s involvement along the way 
In this project IDRC was in the unique position of being both a donor as well as a 
recipient of another donor’s funds for the same project.   In addition, IDRC had a 
particular interest in contributing their intellectual capital to this project.  Adding to the 
complexity of assuming these different roles, IDRC experienced a complete turnover in 
staff dedicated to this project.   In spite of these difficulties IDRC demonstrated an 
unwavering commitment to excellence and carried out these roles successfully.     
Several Consortium members commented on their high level of satisfaction in the 
relationship they had with IDRC as a donor.  When asked about key learnings in this 
process, one highlighted the importance of a good working relationship with donors, 
especially in projects as complex as this one, and then referred to the IDRC/Consortium 
relationship as a good model to follow. 
The two CIDA officers interviewed that had worked directly with this project were also 
very affirming of IDRC’s involvement.   While some concerns were expressed about the 
Resource Pack21 and other aspects of the project, they were quick to affirm IDRC’s 
diligence in good communication and flow of information and competent management of 
the file. 
Moving beyond the donor role, IDRC has also contributed intellectual capital to this 
project as reflected in their active participation in the Expert Advisory Committee 
Meeting in London, May 2002; ongoing support of efforts of the UK partners to fine-tune 
the program proposal; the significant feedback offered on the draft modules of the 
Resource Pack, both in terms of content and form, as well as the way in which they 
worked very closely with the Consortium in many of the decisions made throughout the 
implementation of this project.     
 
On Mainstreaming 
The project was overly ambitious in suggesting that one of its aims was to “mainstream 
peace- and conflict-sensitive development practice.”  It would have been more 
appropriate to frame this aim as “contribute towards the mainstreaming of…” given that 
                                                 
21 One considered the Resource Pack a good introduction to the field, but less useful for the more experienced POs 
requiring more in-depth analysis and information.   Another suggested that simplifying the language and offering a 
more concise summaries would increase the usefulness and usability of the Resource Pack. 
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mainstreaming in organizations requires conditions that extend beyond the reach of this 
project.  To suggest that this project was successful at mainstreaming or that 
mainstreaming has occurred because of this project runs the risk of reducing the 
concept of mainstreaming to the overly simplified use of a tool or development of a 
policy document.  While these may be helpful indicators, mainstreaming refers to the 
incorporation of a set of attitudes, values, and organizational practices that permeate 
the way of working and being of the entire organization.    
One of the risks of prematurely forcing or requiring the process of mainstreaming in 
organizations is the possibility that tools are adopted and documents are generated in 
order to “comply” with expectations, while organizational practices remain largely 
unchanged.  Consider the experiences of mainstreaming with gender, conflict 
transformation, human rights, etc where many organizations adopted new language and 
approaches simply as a way of satisfying donor requirements, without fully 
understanding the implications of how these new “lenses” ought to inform their work.   
Some expressed concern that the same risk applies to CSA – that to the extent CSA is 
donor-driven, more opportunistic organizations may be quick to adopt and “mainstream” 
CSA in order to access resources. 
One of the questions raised concerning mainstreaming was related to the high level of 
“roll-out” fatigue where excessive and constant mainstreaming of gender, environment, 
result-based management, human rights, conflict transformation, HIV, etc., has resulted 
in organizational cultures that simply can not take more.   Just the mention of 
mainstreaming creates internal resistance for understandable reasons.   One can only 
use or apply so many “lenses” or frameworks at once.   How should these lenses be 
prioritized? Can they be prioritized?  Does one trump or implicitly include others?   
While addressing these issues of mainstreaming further is beyond the scope of this 
report, they are mentioned as a way of understanding why achieving the project’s aim of 
“mainstreaming” was limited.  
Several examples illustrate how the project was successful in contributing towards 
mainstreaming in some organizations.   The best example of explicit efforts towards 
mainstreaming involves one of the UK partner organizations.   The reorganization of 
Saferworld was motivated largely by the Resource Pack in efforts to begin 
institutionalizing CSA throughout the organization.  A conflict advisor position was 
created and filled within the organization that is dedicated to helping the geographic 
teams become more conflict sensitive.   They are now developing regional and country 
strategy papers in which more analysis is given to the contexts and situations where 
they work.  These documents are used to inform their strategies.   CSA has also been 
integrated into their Training of Trainers program on small arms.   
Efforts towards mainstreaming CSA in International Alert have included extending the 
scope of their work with conflict sensitivity to include work with private sector companies 
from the extractive industries.  CSA has had influence across the organization and 
forms an integral component of a number of its existing and future projects.   It is 
reported that a large percentage of IA staff now understand conflict sensitivity and use 
this knowledge to inform their own work and that of their respective partners.  
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Within CIDA, one of the policy advisors (formally related to the PCIA project) talked 
about how concepts in the Resource Pack were explicitly integrated in the Country 
Development Programming Frameworks for Tajiskistan and Georgia.  He also 
mentioned considerable work towards mainstreaming being done with FAST, the early 
warning project of Swiss Peace, to develop analytical frameworks for each of the 23 
different countries where they are involved.  Part of funding provided by the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation was used to hire a person responsible for 
monitoring throughout the Swiss bureaucracy how these early warning reports are being 
used.  
Other examples where the language of conflict sensitivity has been adopted in policy 
statements were included in examples of uptake mentioned earlier.    
  
Conclusions 
The PCIA project, reconceived as CSA, has been successful in making significant 
contributions to the field of conflict sensitive approaches to humanitarian, development 
and peacekeeping work.   It has constituted a serious effort to extend the conversations 
and public debate on these methodologies and approaches to include the voice of 
partners in the South.    Further, it has provided an important space for cross-fertilization 
of ideas and approaches by gathering, analyzing and making public the experiences 
and knowledge related to conflict sensitive practices accumulated within the private 
domain of many different organizations.  
The Resource Pack produced under this project has made an important contribution to 
the global literature on peace and conflict impact assessment methodologies and 
conflict sensitivity particularly in light of the fact that it is the only compendium which 
documents and analyses from a critical perspective, the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of PCIA tools, guidelines and practices currently in use amongst bilateral, 
multilateral and international NGOs.    
The design of the project and consortium approach resulted in a rich and dynamic 
process that successfully engaged an extensive array of stakeholders on both global 
and local levels in conversations about conflict sensitivity.   The strategy used locally in 
the three Southern contexts of bringing stakeholders together from government, donors 
and NGOs created not only the possibility of increased awareness of conflict sensitivity 
in their own work, but also the possibility of developing a common language and vision 
extending across these different stakeholder groups as they work collectively at conflict-
sensitive development in their regions.   Awareness raised at the global level throughout 
this project has contributed to that fact that conflict sensitivity has now become part of 
the lexicon of many development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations. 
While initial indications of impact suggest the project has had greater influence in 
Northern-based donor and international NGOs, impact in Southern-based organizations 
working at the local level has been more limited.   The prospects for sustainability and 
increased impact will depend upon the extent in which partners in the South continue to 
move forward with the trainings and national applications processes that have only 
recently begun.  Contextualizing the Resource Pack, framing its contents in a more 
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appropriate language and level of abstraction will be a vital step towards making it more 
immediately relevant for local practitioners.    
One of the important contributions of this project was the systematic way in which 
conflict sensitive approaches were linked to the entire programming cycle.   Issues and 
suggestions about how conflict sensitivity can inform each step in the programming 
cycle are effectively addressed in the Resource Pack.    However, it stops short of 
providing comprehensive case studies drawn from experience illustrating the application 
of conflict sensitivity throughout the entire cycle.   An important next step would be 
further research to observe, document and produce case studies involving the 
application of CSA throughout an entire programming cycle.   This could involve more 
traditional case-study research on existing experiences or the design of a participatory 
action research project in a Southern context.   The development of local as well as 
sector-wide case studies to accompany the Resource Pack would greatly enhance its 
relevance and utility for practitioners at all levels.    
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Annex 1 
List of documents reviewed 
 
 
• Berghoff Handbook for Conflict Transformation, 2001: 
o “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment” – A Dialogue Article 
o “Evaluation and Conflict Impact Assessment” – Mark Hoffman 
o “Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA” – Manuela Leonhardt 
o “PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool” – Marc Howard Ross 
o “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: A Development 
Practitioner’s Perspective” (response paper) – Hans Gsanger & Christoph 
Feyen 
• “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On:  The 
Commodification of an Idea” (response paper) – Ken Bush 
• Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and 
Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack 
• Final Project Proposal for RP # 100226 “Operationalizing Peace and Conflict 
Impact Assessment” 
• Handover Note on RP 100226, S. Baranyi 2003 
• FEWER project reports to IDRC 
• IDRC project reports to CIDA 
• Trip reports on visits to Conflict Sensitivity project, S. Baranyi and E. Alma 
• Email correspondence between IDRC and UK partners 
• Newsletters produce by consortium partners  Volumes 1-4 
• Policy papers (CIDA’s CDPFs for Tajiskistan and Georgia) as well as web-based 
documents related to uptake of the Resource Pack. 
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Annex 2 
List of Individuals interviewed 
 
Eileen Alma Project Coordinator, IDRC 
Colleen Duggan Senior Program Specialist, IDRC 
Terry Smutylo IDRC Evaluation Unit 
Stephen Baranyi Former Program Specialist in IDRC in charge of project 
Ken Bush Former IDRC Evaluation Unit 
Michael Koros CIDA (former officer in charge of PCIA project) 
Alain Adibe CIDA, former officer in charge of PCIA project 
Serge Koskinen CIDA, project officer in Peace and Security Unit 
Paul Eavis Executive Director, Saferworld 
Hesta Groenwald Saferworld 
Rachel Goldwyn CARE International, UK  (Formerly at International Alert) 
Adam Barbolet International Alert 
Andrew Sherriff Formerly at International Alert 
Leyla-Claude Werleigh Formerly at FEWER 
Celine Moyroud Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP, New York  
(formerly worked on the project with Saferworld in Nairobi) 
Alex Nyago APFO, Kenya 
Rose Othieno CECORE, Uganda 
Yadira Soto Organization of American States 
Interviews from Sri Lanka 
Jeevan Thiagarajah Executive Director, CHA 
Lara Perera Psychosocial Coordinator, CHA 
Srinatha Perera Deputy Executive Director, CHA 
Chamindri CHA 
R. Bhakeerathan  CHA District officer, Jaffana  
Aruna Dayaratne Program Officer, Oxfam 
Patrick Brochard CIDA Director Program Support Unit, Colombo 
Agnus CIDA Coordinator Shakti Gender Equity Programme 
Joe Williams  CIDA Senior Program Officer, Programme Support Unit, Colombo 
Bandula Hennadige  Senior Program Officer, Royal Netherlands Embassy 
M.A. Lahiru Perera Director of Programs, CARE Sri Lanka  
Nikki Burns Peace and Reconciliation Coordinator, CARE International Sri Lanka 
Jegananthen Training Officer CARE Sri Lanka 
Ragina Ramalingam Director Evaluation and Training, FORUT: Campaign for Development and 
Solidarity IOGT Movement of Norway  
Ruby Karunakaran Program Officer, Helvetas (Swiss Association for International Cooperation, Sri 
Lanka) 
Nilhan de Mel National Peace Council, Sri Lanka 
Rudy  Info Share, Colombo 
Anthea Mulakala, Reconciliation and Development Advisor, DFID Sri Lanka 
Brian Smith Post Conflict Specialist, Asian Development Bank, Sri Lanka Resident Mission 
Jan Koetler Conflict Transformation Expert, FLICT (Fund for Local Initiatives for Conflict 
Transformation, supported by GTZ, Germany) 
Malathy de Alwis Feminist author and a senior fellow at the International Centre for Ethnic 
Studies, Colombo.  
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Annex 3 
Questions posed by IDRC for the Evaluation 
 
General: 
What has been the influence and reach of the project’s tools for peace and conflict impact assessment 
(PCIA) in Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Kenya?   
Who is using the resource pack? For what purposes?  Is anyone who should be using it/should have 
been introduced to it not aware of it? 
How are they employing it in their work? Comment on potential and actual outcomes. 
 
Achievement of overall project objective and results: 
What evidence can you find that governments, NGOs and donor agencies have used the resource pack 
to mainstream peace and conflict sensitive development practice into their approach, policies and 
programs for development, humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention?   
Which outputs were not produced and why? 
 
Gender and social analysis:   
How did the organizations involved and the research results produced reflect/not reflect a sensitivity to 
gender inequalities or otherwise incorporate/not incorporate gender analysis? 
Did this project and its outputs have any negative impacts on specific groups or individuals? 
What were these and how could they have been mitigated? 
 
Coordination:   
To what extent did the UK-based organizations involve southern partners?  What problems were 
encountered?  How were the problems handled? 
What were the coordination challenges encountered between FEWER, International Alert and 
Saferworld?  How were the challenges handled? 
 
Lessons learned in application of PCIA tools (outlined in resource pack): 
What were the challenges faced/lessons learned in the National Application workshops run in Sri Lanka, 
Uganda and Kenya? 
How did/didn’t the national application workshops/dissemination of the resource pack help to facilitate 
dialogue between Southern NGOs and their governments on issues of development? 
 
Prospects for sustainability:  
Bearing in mind the unexpected interruption of this project, which components have been picked and are 
now being used or may be used in the future by local or international organizations or governments? 
 
Role of the Steering Committee: 
What role did the steering committee play in the implementation of this project? What were the challenges 
it encountered?  How were the challenges handled? 
 




ORGANISATIONS / TARGETS 
(EXAMPLES ONLY - an exhaustive listing of all 
targets is on the database 
AMOUNT
HARD COPY MAILINGS 
APFO, CHA, CECORE For count distributions and own resources 2250 








Authors, Funders, and Advisory 
Committee 
 
Author(s) of the document 





FEWER Network Members, Alert 
and Saferworld wider group of 
institutional partners in other 
geographical settings 
Network members of FEWER 
Alert's partners in Africa, Eurasia, Asia, Latin America
Saferworld partners in Africa, Europe, Asia 
 
Operational Humanitarian / 
Development, Peacebuilding 
Agencies 
Headquarters in the North 
 EXAMPLES ONLY 
• Oxfam 
• Merlin 
• Action Aid 
• Red Cross 
• SCFUK 
• Christian Aid 
• Action against Hunger 
• Islamic relief 
• etc. 
100*











Other Relevant Conflict Resolution 
Organisations 
• Conciliation Resources 
• Search for the Common Ground 
• International IDEA 
• International Crisis Group 
50 
Key Donors Agencies 
(some of these may also appear 
elsewhere in this dissemination 
strategy)   
 
(relevant departments within 
agencies 
'i.e. Conflict Affairs, and also 
• CHAD-DFID 
• EU Contacts 
• DFID (EU Dept/Africa Policy/CHAD) 
• Sida - 
• Dutch MFA 
• Danida 
• Dutch MFA 
• Irish MFA/Development Co-operation 
100 
                                                 
22 CSA Consortium memo to CIDA and IDRC dated March 5, 2004 
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regional 
desks in the countries of national 
application) 
• Swiss Agencies for Development Co-operation 
• Norwegian MFA 
• CIDA & DFAIT 








(head-quarters in Geneva/New 
York a 
relevant country offices - key 
conflict 
people within them) 
• UN - Secretary-General's Office 
• UNDPA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP 
• UNOPS, OCHA, UNDESA 
• UN regional 'economic commissions' 
• Etc. 
50 
EU • all Consortium EU contacts  
(RELEX, DEV, EUROPEAID ACP Secretariat) 
10 
Regional Organisations 
(particularly those units concerned 
with conflict issues) 
• African Union 
• IGAD 
• Organization of American States 
• ASEAN 
50 
International Financial Institutions 
• World Bank 
• IMF 
• Regional Development Banks (Asia, Latin 
America, Africa) 
20 
Libraries & Documentation Centres 
(ensuring the 'intellectual heritage 
& 
accessibility' of the documents) 
Copyright libraries: 
• British Library and Copyright libraries agency  
(5 copies) 
(It is a legal requirement to deposit copies in these 
libraries & copyright protection for everything 
published in the UK such as the Resource Pack) 
 






Key specialist libraries: 
50 
Key Northern/Southern Training 
Organizations products that they 
produce)  
• Responding to Conflict 
• Coalition for Peace in Africa 
• INTRAC 
50 
Relevant (Practitioner, Policy and 
Academic) Journals (for reviews 
and profiling of Resource Pack) 
• Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 
• Disasters 
• Journal of Development and Peacebuilding 
• Journal of Conflict, Security and Development 
• Journal of Development Studies 
• European Journal of Development Research 
• Security Dialogue 
50 
TOTAL  3,220 
Hard copy mailings through 
Commercial Channels 
• Transparency International 
• Christian Aid 
400 
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Annex 5 
Institutional Learning for IDRC 
A second and lesser part of this evaluation was to explore what institutional learnings 
might be harvested from IDRC’s experience with the PCIA project.   I think there was 
some hope that the experience of this project might be useful in surfacing some broader 
institutional issues and patterns of practice such as staffing logic, workloads, etc.   In 
addition, there was interest in reviewing the whole story of IDRC’s involvement with 
PCIA with an eye towards understanding the shift from intellectual pioneering work to 
what became a more traditional donor role in the project under review in this evaluation.    
Unfortunately, given the priorities established for this evaluation, I was unable to gather 
the data that would allow me to confidently offer some conclusions or opinions 
regarding institutional issues or lessons emerging from this experience.    For instance, 
a clear theme throughout this project relates to severe workload issues, staffing logic 
where time is divided between different initiatives and 100% turnover in staff.   However, 
understanding these issues and to what extent they constitute a institutional pattern of 
practice would have required more time and further conversations with IDRC staff.   
Because the interviews centered on the PCIA project itself, very little time was given to 
these other issues.     
I can only offer the following initial observations or questions that emerged based on the 
limited information I was able to obtain with the hope that they prompt further reflection 
as IDRC seeks to maximize their learning from this experience. 
 
IDRC as ‘intellectual pioneer” in the field of PCIA 
There is no doubt that IDRC, through the work of Ken Bush and the Evaluation Unit, 
accomplished groundbreaking work that positioned IDRC as an intellectual 
leader/pioneer in the newly emerging field of PCIA.   However, as noted in the internal 
document “IDRC and PCIA: Retrospective, Update, Perspective and Options” IDRC’s 
role shifted from being an ideas generator and intellectual pioneer to the more 
traditional role of funder and supporter.    As explained in the report, IDRC did continue 
to make significant intellectual contributions throughout the project.  Nonetheless, it 
seems as though IDRC failed to maximize its intellectual leadership established early on 
in this field.     Some of the factors contributing to this loss of intellectual leadership 
include: 
• The decision to hire a PO for Latin America (S. Baranyi who was also expected 
to take on PCIA work) rather than Ken Bush:   I was unable to interview Necla 
and the reasons for this decision remain unclear.  However, Ken’s departure 
illustrates how an institution’s intellectual capital too often resides in individuals.   
With Ken’s departure and IDRC’s lack of real capacity in this field, it became 
necessary to farm this work out to others.   Consultants were hired to develop a 
paper for the expert meeting since IDRC could no longer do this internally.     
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• Significant changes within PBR:   A number of contextual circumstances all 
happening around the same time limited IDRC’s internal capacity resulting in 
the decision to turn to the UK consortium.   The closing of South African office, 
Middle East PO fired by regional office, Necla on the way out, Michael Koros’ 
resignation, and Stephen Baranyi going on parental leave all contributed to 
what was described as the “implosion” of PBR. 
• !00% staff turnover through out the PCIA story 
• Staffing logic that divides ROs time between projects that may limit the level of 
concentration and depth given to any one project. 
• Political work not done for Zimbabwe:   M. Koros positioned IDRC for on-the-
ground research with the application of PCIA to land reform.   However, failure 
to understand the political work necessary for such an undertaking (PCIA is 
political) resulted in the abortion of what could potentially have been a 
significant applied research project.    This situation caused some to question 
whether or not IDRC was really ready to recognize and assume the political 
consequences of PCIA work. 
• Mixed goals or agendas:   It seems as though within IDRC three different goals 
were at play: continuing to develop and assume intellectual leadership in PCIA, 
developing and strengthening southern capacity, and fund raising.   In the end, 
the latter interest of fund raising was privileged in the decision to develop big 
project and seek funding rather than continue building on PCIA work with Ken.   
IDRC’s intellectual leadership was largely lost.  Though the project was farmed 
out to the UK based consortium, IDRC held on to their commitment to 
developing southern capacity by funding directly the Sri Lanka experience and 
supporting the UK work in the African contexts.     
  
IDRC: Donor or Researcher 
Here my own lack of knowledge about IDRC comes into play.   Given its name, 
International Development Research Centre, I assumed the primary work of IDRC is 
research.  However, in this project, it seems as though decisions were made that 
undervalued the importance of research.   For instance, the decision to hire PO for 
Latin America rather than continue investing in Bush’s work, or the lost opportunity to 
apply PCIA to land reform in Zimbabwe (again, I recognize many intervening variables 
here and don’t wish to over simplify).   Ultimately, IDRC’s role in this project was 
primarily that of donor which may be more reflective of IDRC’s work in 
general…supporting other research initiatives rather than doing the research.   
Nonetheless, the experience of the Evaluation Unit as well as initial pioneering work of 
Ken demonstrates IDRC’s capacity to move beyond the role of donor and do good 
research and assume intellectual leadership. 
Given IDRC’s interest in bringing Southern voices into the conversation and 
strengthening Southern capacity, I was left wondering why IDRC was not more 
involved in shaping the research aspects or methodology (rather than contents or 
results) of this project, supporting more applied or participatory action research in the 
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South.   Though southern contexts were involved in the project, the research 
methodology was very Northern and limited in its potential for adequately harvesting 
knowledge and experience in those Southern contexts.   (I recognize my own biases 
regarding research goals and methodology, which may be quite different from 
IDRC’s…so again, forgive my lack of familiarity with IDRC’s work). 
 
Use of PCIA within IDRC    
It is interesting to note that while one of the aims of the PCIA project was to contribute 
towards the mainstreaming of PCIA in development, humanitarian assistance and 
peacebuilding organizations, use of PCIA within IDRC has been limited.   It would not 
be realistic to assume that mainstreaming of PCIA should have already occurred within 
IDRC.    Prior to the project, no consolidated framework or resource pack existed that 
could map out strategies for mainstreaming.   IDRC has been learning on-the-go.   Also, 
the phenomena of “mainstreaming fatigue” and other mainstreaming challenges 
referred to in the report also exist within IDRC.  Hopefully now, with the Resource Pack 
and learnings from the project, IDRC will engage in the long process of trying to 
institutionalize PCIA as another operative framework for informing future projects and 
programs.   
While little progress on mainstreaming is understandable, I do question why PCIA did 
not at least remain embedded in the Evaluation Unit where it was born.    Somehow the 
gap was not bridged between the pioneering work of Ken Bush on PCIA and the equally 
pioneering work that lead to the development of Outcome Mapping.    Had PCIA been 
integrated into the Outcome Mapping framework (which incidentally covers the entire 
programming cycle), the many organizations around the globe now using Outcome 
Mapping would already be familiar with the importance of PCIA as an operative lens 
through which to conceive, design, implement, monitor and evaluate development work.   
One of the main assumptions of PCIA is that development work will have an impact, for 
better or worse, on human relationships…it is not value-free.   Yet, Outcome Mapping 
seems to assume a value-neutral approach….which is why gender is not explicitly 
incorporated either.    This is not meant to be an evaluation of Outcome Mapping – just 
a personal observation of a relationship that seems obvious to me, but is essentially 
non-existent within IDRC.   In talking with Terry, he initially hadn’t recognized the 
possible relationship between these two fields. 
This may be one concrete area to explore immediate implications and possible 
application of PCIA internally as one effort towards mainstreaming. 
 
Staff committed to excellence 
Regardless of adverse conditions such as severe workload issues, staff turn-over, etc, 
the persistent commitment to excellence demonstrated in IDRC staff is noteworthy.   As 
noted in the report, consortium members suggested IDRC’s way of engaging and 
working with partners provides a good model for other donors to follow.   They were 
actively involved and engaged with the substance of the project, offering opinions and 
feedback while at the same time remaining flexible and respectful of the partners’ 
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interests and perspectives.    The documentation reviewed was impressive in terms of 
the level of detail and organization that again demonstrates the high level of 
professionalism with which work is conducted.    Equally impressive is the willingness to 
make the sacrifices necessary to get the job done well (unfortunately, this willingness 
also permits the perpetuation of an unhealthy system characterized by severe 
workloads).   For instance, even when no more funding is available for RO position, she 
continues to offer assistance and what resulted in the need for accompaniment of the 
UK consortium on an almost daily basis.    
The same can be said of the UK partners who also made sacrifices towards the end in 
order to fulfill project obligations.   In the end, IDRC set a great example. 
 
Possibilities for future contribution to PCIA/CSA development 
As noted in the report, one possible role for IDRC could involve investing in more 
Southern-based research the goal of developing thorough case-studies illustrating PCIA 
throughout the programming cycle.     I’m not sure to what extent IDRC uses or funds 
participatory action research methodologies, but it seems as though this would be a 
powerful way of following up on work begun in the PCIA / CSA project.     In order to 
develop case-studies of the entire programming cycle, a longer research project would 
be required since the time between design, implementation and evaluation can not nor 
should not be compressed.     
Continuing to build Southern capacity may require new ways of doing research that 
allows effective and appropriate codification of southern knowledge and experience – 
moving beyond Northern paradigms. 
One of the significant contributions of IDRC in this project was the way in which it 
facilitated the sharing of knowledge across organizations and institutions, from North to 
South.   While many organizations will continue advancing their own internal PCIA/CSA 
work, space needs to be created for this ongoing cross-fertilization.   This may also be a 
role that IDRC chooses to continue to fulfill. 
 
 
 
